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A LOT TO ASK: REVIEW ESSAY OF
MARTHA NUSSBAUM’S FROM DISGUST TO

HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MARY ANNE CASE*

The title of Martha Nussbaum‘s recent book From Disgust to
Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law encapsulates well the
book‘s normative and descriptive claims. In Nussbaum‘s descriptive
account, the politics of disgust have been and remain at the root of all
opposition to recognition of legal rights for homosexuals, whether the issue
be sodomy laws, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, same-sex
marriage or venues for public sex. Although she acknowledges that explicit
appeals to disgust have declined in recent years, Nussbaum argues that
disgust ―has not gone away, it has gone underground.‖1 In Nussbaum‘s
normative view, disgust not only should be ruled categorically out of
bounds as a basis for law and policy, but must be thoroughly extirpated and
replaced with a ―politics of humanity‖ involving not only sympathy,
imagination, and respect, but ―something else, something closer to love.‖2
From the moment early in its conception when she first sought my
input on this new book, I had to confess myself troubled by its central
claims, given my own very different take on the constitutional law of sexual
orientation.3 As I shall explain in the remainder of this essay, it seems to
* Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am
grateful to participants in Columbia Law School‘s Nussbaum Symposium, particularly
Martha Nussbaum, Liz Emens, Katherine Franke, Suzanne Goldberg, and Janet Jakobsen; as
well as to Susan Bandes, Taylor Flynn, Mary Anne Franks, Janet Halley, Andy Koppelman,
Jim Madigan, Katie Oliviero and Bob Smith for brainstorming and bibliographic assistance;
to Lauren Berlant, Suzanne Goldberg, Janet Halley, Michael McConnell, John Portmann,
Jeff Redding, Geof Stone, and Winnie Sullivan for comments on drafts ; and to Deborah
Megdal and Margaret Schilt for research assistance.
1

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION &
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xv (2010) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY].
2
3

Id. at xvii.

See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
SUP. CT. REV. 75 [hereinafter Case, Of “This” and “That”]; Mary Anne Case, Marriage
Licenses, 2004 Lockhart Lecture (October 26, 2004), 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005); Mary

90

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 19:1

me that From Disgust to Humanity descriptively accounts for too little and
normatively asks for too much. Although I am a lawyer and not a moral
philosopher, I shall begin by questioning the more philosophical, less legal
aspect of Nussbaum‘s normative claims before moving on to give an
alternate account of developments in the law.
First let me ask, what is the minimum Nussbaum now demands of
the opponents of homosexuality? From this overarching question a number
of subsidiary questions arise. These include: If disgust has indeed, as
Nussbaum acknowledges, ―gone underground‖ in contemporary debates
about gay rights, is this a bad thing? If disgust is out-of-bounds, is there, in
Nussbaum‘s view, a more appropriate emotion for opponents of
homosexuality to mobilize in aid of their opposition? Or is Nussbaum in
effect demanding nothing short of complete capitulation from them?
Nussbaum has long been of the view that disgust is always an
illegitimate emotion on which to ground law and policy. She first developed
this view a decade ago in response to William Ian Miller and Dan Kahan.
Miller, in The Anatomy of Disgust, while acknowledging that ―the idiom of
disgust‖ had its dangers, argues that it not only is well nigh indispensible, it
also has ―certain virtues for voicing moral assertions. It signals seriousness,
commitment, indisputability, presentness and reality.‖4 Kahan, embracing
Miller‘s account, seeks to ―redeem disgust in the eyes of those who value
equality, solidarity, and other progressive values‖ and, thus redeemed, to
mobilize it for use in the criminal law.5 Nussbaum insisted in response that,
as with envy and jealousy, ―the specific cognitive content of disgust makes
it always of dubious reliability in social life, but especially in the life of the
law.‖6 As Nussbaum sees it, taking her cue from Paul Rozin,7 disgust is
―anti-social‖;8 it involves a discomfort with and repudiation of our animal

Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of
Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643 (1993).
4

THE LAW

WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 180 (1997).

5
Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in THE PASSIONS OF
63 (Susan Bandes ed., 2001).
6

Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies and the Law, in
THE PASSIONS OF THE LAW 22 (Susan Bandes ed., 2001).
7

Id. at 23–25.

8

Id. at 28.
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nature which is then ―projected outwards onto vulnerable people and
groups.‖9
Nussbaum does not, however, repudiate the use of all emotions in
formulating law and policy. In earlier work, she suggested that anger or
indignation compared favorably with disgust in this regard:
Indignation, by contrast [with disgust], centrally involves the idea
of a wrong or a harm . . . done, whether to the person angered or
to someone or something to whom that person ascribes
importance. . . . Because the notion of harm or damage lies at the
core of anger‘s cognitive content, it is clear that it rests on
reasoning that can be publicly articulated and publicly shaped.
Damages and harms are a central part of what any public culture,
and any system of law, must deal with; they are therefore a staple
10
of public persuasion and public argument.

Although she acknowledged in Hiding from Humanity that ―the
reasons underlying a person‘s anger . . . can be false or groundless,‖11 she
went on to valorize anger as a basis for legal sanctions in a variety of
situations for which scholars such as Dan Kahan had in her view
inappropriately foregrounded and endorsed the language of disgust. ―To
violations of the equality of a fellow citizen, the appropriate response is
anger, not disgust,‖12 she claimed, going on to make the same argument
with respect to a variety of sex crimes, including necrophilia and the use of
―religiously charged objects for sexual purposes‖ such as the ―the sexual
profanation of a religious sanctuary‖:13
What we feel when a religious sanctuary is violated is outrage:
outrage because the protection of religion is a value to which we
have deeply committed ourselves as a society. Similarly, what we
feel when someone takes the corpse of our loved one and
damages it is anger, because it is a particularly grave kind of
harm, whether or not we also view it as similar to a rape. When
the surviving spouse has sex with the corpse, we may feel pity,
9

Id. at 22.

10

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME
LAW 99 (2004) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY].
11

Id.

12

Id. at 147.

13

Id. at 155–56.

AND THE
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but we will also feel outrage that he was prepared to care so little
about whether there was a living and consenting being there. In
all of these cases, we may also feel disgust, but perfectly good
reasons for whatever legal regulation we might wish to
14
contemplate are contained in our response of outrage.

Outrage is indeed what many opponents of gay rights say they feel
at many of the examples of homosexual activity Nussbaum‘s new book is
concerned with, from public displays of affection by gay couples and gay
pride events, to legal recognition of same-sex marriage and adoption of
children by same-sex couples, from the presence of sex clubs in
neighborhoods to the presence of gay teachers and gay-themed readings in
public school classrooms. But the word ―outrage‖ only appears in From
Disgust to Humanity to describe the reaction Nussbaum, and by implication
any right thinking person, has to the words and actions of gay rights
opponents such as Paul Cameron,15 never once as a reaction she
recommends to those opponents in preference to disgust.16 Nussbaum seems
to see gay rights opponents only as ―outrageous,‖ not as outraged.
14

Id. at 157. Additionally, with respect to a court‘s refusal to accede to the request
of a convicted ―murderer named Beldotti [who] apparently killed in order to gratify sadistic
sexual desires‖ that ―the dildoes, photos of the victim, the trash bags in which she had been
placed, and other sexual paraphernalia be returned to his representatives outside prison,‖
Nussbaum insisted in Hiding from Humanity that ―outrage is sufficient to explain the result
and why it is correct; we do not need to rely on disgust.‖ NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM
HUMANITY, supra note 10, at 170. I include this example because it also involves sex acts as
to which Nussbaum has recommended outrage as an alternative to disgust in calibrating a
legal response, but I relegate it to a footnote because, as Nussbaum herself points out and I
agree, there are a number of justificatory explanations for the legal result in the Beldotti case
that go well beyond a need to rely on either emotion.
15

See NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 79–80 (noting
that in Bowers v. Hardwick, ―Paul Cameron‘s most outrageous claims were not
foregrounded‖); see also id. at 55 (―To most Americans today, however, it seems outrageous
that the police would have the right to enter someone‘s bedroom to see what sexual acts are
being performed there.‖).
16

Nussbaum does not recommend anger or indignation in response to gay rights
opponents either. I am not sure there is a distinction relevant for present purposes between
―outrage,‖ ―anger‖ and ―indignation,‖ words dictionaries tend to treat as synonyms. To the
extent Nussbaum does distinguish between them, the distinction she makes is puzzling, in
that she seems to be more receptive to ―outrage‖ and ―anger‖ than to ―indignation‖ as a basis
for law and policy, notwithstanding that ―indignation‖ is usually defined as ―anger aroused
by something unjust, unworthy, or mean.‖ This may result from her association of the word
―indignation‖ with Devlin‘s use of it in The Enforcement of Morals, where, in an argument
of which she disapproves, he couples ―indignation‖ with ―intolerance‖ and ―disgust‖ as
essential ―forces behind the moral law‖ which justify prohibitions on homosexual sex.
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Because I do not view ratcheting up the level of anger in the gay
rights debate as conducive to either civil peace or moral progress, I must
confess myself relieved that Nussbaum does not in the end recommend
outrage as a substitute for disgust to gay rights opponents. I am troubled,
however, that her reasons for failing to do so seem to amount to an
unwillingness to recognize any scope whatsoever for legitimate opposition
to what Scalia infamously dubbed ―the so-called homosexual agenda, by
which [he] mean[s] the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists
directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached
to homosexual conduct.‖17 To be clear, like Nussbaum, I have
wholeheartedly signed on to this agenda. But I do not think much in the
way of legal or social progress toward it will be achieved if we
misunderstand or misrepresent the views of our opponents or if we ask too
much of them. Later in this essay, I shall give a fuller account of why in my
view attempting to reduce all opposition to gay rights to disgust is as a
descriptive matter neither accurate nor helpful.
Before doing so, however, let me consider further the normative
demands Nussbaum makes of gay rights opponents. According to
Nussbaum, ―Disgust has two opponents today, each increasingly powerful
in social, political, and even legal life: respect, and sympathy.‖18 By
speaking in the context of the regulation of homosexuality only of the
―opponents‖ of disgust, rather than of alternatives to it, as she did when
discussing other regulatory regimes for which the language of disgust had
been mobilized such as those governing animal cruelty and necrophilia,
Nussbaum signals her unwillingness seriously to consider any alternative
reasons to those sounding in disgust for laws or policies disfavoring
homosexuality. She demands of gay rights opponents, not a transformation
of rhetoric, but no less than ―a transformation at the level of the human
heart.‖19 They should, in her view, cultivate what Adam Smith called
―humanity‖ (defined by Nussbaum as ―a capacity for generous and flexible
engagement with the sufferings and hopes of other people‖) and what
Cicero called ―humanitas‖ (defined by Nussbaum as ―a kind of
responsiveness to others that prominently included the ability to imagine
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 17 (1965). For Nussbaum‘s critique of
Devlin, see, e.g., NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 10, at 75. I will suggest
below ways in which I think Nussbaum fails to take full account of Devlin‘s argument.
17

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting).

18

NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, supra note 1, at xv.

19

Id. at xx.
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their experiences‖).20 For this politics of humanity ―respect, as usually
conceived, is not sufficient . . . something else, something closer to love,
must also be involved,‖ Nussbaum insists.21
I fear I am not as sanguine as Nussbaum seems to be that the
necessary result of imaginative engagement with the experiences of gay
people will inevitably be embrace of what Scalia calls the homosexual
agenda. Imagination is not what Paul Cameron, focused as he is on vivid
images of sweaty, bloody, sticky, dangerous ―fecal sex,‖22 seems to lack.
Nussbaum, who thinks Cameron views gays as inhuman ―slimy slug[s],‖23
would respond that his all too vivid imagination lacks sympathy and
responsiveness to others, but, whether or not this is true of Cameron, it is
surely not true of all opponents of gay rights.24 At least some of those who
favor legal restrictions on homosexual conduct do so not because they fail
to imagine that choices faced by gay people are ―relevantly similar to their
own,‖25 but because they can imagine it all too well. Consider, for example,
the reaction of one of my employers at the time, a partner at a large New
York law firm and a married father, on the day Bowers v. Hardwick26 came
down. ―This is a great decision,‖ he insisted, ―because we are all inherently
bisexual and it saves us from ourselves.‖ Nussbaum seems to assume that
imagination and sympathy will necessarily lead heterosexuals to analogize
gay desires to their own socially approved desires for respectable love; she
should consider more seriously the risk that some heterosexuals will instead
draw an analogy to those of their own desires they see themselves as having
nobly struggled to suppress in the interests of respectability, moral virtue or
social order, whether those dark desires be for promiscuity, adultery,
BDSM, fetish sex, or homosexuality itself. Even if engaging in homosexual
activity or a homosexual ―lifestyle‖ is not just the province of ―others‖ but

20

Id. at xviii (internal citations omitted).

21

Id. at xviii.

22

Id. at 4.

23

Id. at xvii.

24

I am grateful to Mary Anne Franks for focusing my attention on this point.

25

NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 48.

26

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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something one might be tempted to do oneself, it does not necessarily
follow that one will welcome legal approval to do so.27
Moreover, some really do hate the sin but love the sinner. Focus on
the Family‘s decision to use the name ―Love Won Out‖ for the program in
which it urges church leaders and family members to respond ―in a Christlike way to the issue of homosexuality‖ and seeks to offer ―hope . . . to
those struggling with same-sex attraction‖ cannot easily be dismissed as
hypocritical or self-deceptive.28 Love Won Out‘s hope is that, with the
love of Christ and their family to strengthen them, those who struggle with
same-sex attraction—which the program stresses is not their own fault but
the result of, for example, childhood sexual molestation or an inadequate
display of paternal love29—will be able to turn away from a gay lifestyle
―fraught with all sorts of dangers and misery.‖30 Precisely their love leads
some to wish to do all in their power to rescue those they love from
homosexuality, and, in their view, the law should aid them by putting
brakes on the slide down the slippery slope to acceptance of homosexuality.
27
See analysis of the Lawrence briefing in Case, Of “This” and “That,” supra
note 3, at 90 (―While O‘Connor may be right that ‗those harmed by this law are those who
have a same sex sexual orientation,‘ on the view of many of Respondent‘s amici those most
benefited by the law are those without such an orientation who might otherwise be tempted.
The assumption in briefs supporting the Respondent is that anyone can do these acts and
anyone who does do them can be harmed by them.‖).
28
See Love Won Out, http://www.lovewonout.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
Their ―goals include aiding parents who want to learn how to better love their sons or
daughters without compromising their faith.‖ ―Thank you for giving me hope for a loving
relationship with my son,‖ writes one parent on their website. Love Won Out: Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.lovewonout.com/questions/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
29
―We advise fathers, if you don‘t hug your sons, some other man will,.‖
psychologist Joseph Nicolosi, president of the National Association for Research and
Treatment of Homosexuality (―NARTH‖) tells Love Won Out participants. Jim Burroway,
Part 2: „Love Won Out‟ - Parents Struggle With „No Exceptions‟, BOX TURTLE BULLETIN
(Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/2007/02/22/228 (last visited Feb. 1,
2010).
30
Jim Burroway, Part 3: „Love Won Out‟: A Whole New Dialect, BOX TURTLE
BULLETIN (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/2007/03/06/243 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2010). Burroway, the editor of Box Turtle Bulletin and a gay rights activist, wrote a
multipart series reporting his experiences attending a Love Won Out conference, concluding
somewhat to his surprise that ―there was nothing exotic or frightening about the seven
hundred people who attended. . . . In fact, I found the people there to be exceptionally warm,
friendly and cheerful.‖ Jim Burroway, Part 1: „Love Won Out‟—What‟s Love Got To Do
With
It?,
BOX
TURTLE
BULLETIN
(Feb.
15,
2007),
http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/2007/02/15/224.
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It is also far from clear that Nussbaum‘s demands on behalf of gay
people would respond to the preferences of all those who have embraced,
rather than struggled against, their own homosexual desires. At least some
segments of the queer community might value less than Nussbaum does on
their behalf the demand that others ―see [them] in a certain way . . .
endowing [them] with life and purpose, rather than with dirt and dross, with
human dignity rather than with foulness.‖31 Some queer projects repudiate
the demand for such recognition, and instead embrace shame, dirt, outlaw
status, even death and purposelessness. It may be as disrespectful of them as
it of their opponents to demand imaginative sanitization on their behalf.32
Even as a project in moral philosophy, therefore, I have my doubts
that Nussbaum‘s demand for love as a component of a politics of humanity
in relation to homosexuality will succeed in the way she hopes. But
Nussbaum defines her project as one in constitutional law, and in this
context love seems far too much to ask. Martin Luther King, Jr. had it right
in my view when he said, ―The law may not be able to make a man love
me, but at least it can keep him from lynching me.‖33 Kendall Thomas was
also right when he used King‘s statement as the epigraph for his 1992
article arguing that constitutional law needed to take into account the ways
in which rulings like Bowers v. Hardwick were seen to license gay bashing,
34
not out of love for gays and lesbians, but simply so as not to breach ―the
31

NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 50.

32

I am grateful to Katherine Franke for encouraging me in comments at the
Nussbaum Symposium at Columbia to address this additional difficulty with Nussbaum‘s
proposals, something I confessed myself hesitant to do because I was having difficulty
enough struggling to understand and do justice to Nussbaum‘s arguments and to the
arguments of opponents of gay rights without adding to the mix shame-embracing queer
theorists, whose arguments I am particularly unconvinced I can understand or do justice to,
notwithstanding the generous help I have gotten from Katherine and from Janet Halley.
33
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431
(1992). Another way of putting this objection is by analogy to Mary Becker‘s critique of
Katherine Franke‘s Theorizing Yes. I am all for love, just as Becker is ―all for more emphasis
on women‘s right to sexual pleasure.‖ But I would no more look to the law for love than
Becker ―would . . . look to lawyers for a theory of female sexual pleasure. Law solves
problems, redresses harms, redistributes income. Given the purpose of law, the focus of legal
feminism on sex has appropriately involved sexual harms.‖ Mary Becker, Commentary:
Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495, 1525 (2001) (discussing
Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 181 (2001)).
34

(1992).

Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1431
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most basic term of the social compact: the affirmative obligation of the state
to use the lawful authority of government to protect citizens from lawless
violence.‖35
If love is beyond the law‘s power to require or bestow, if love
cannot be expected to be either a cause or an effect of the legal regulation of
homosexuality, what of sympathy and respect? First, it is far from clear that
the two necessarily lead in the same direction or that the direction either
leads is inevitably one of which Nussbaum would approve. One who
remains convinced that moral opprobrium should continue to attach to
homosexual conduct might respond to Nussbaum‘s call for respect that the
highest form of respect he or she can show to gay men and lesbians is to
take them seriously as moral agents,36 rather than as sick, weak or helpless
slaves of their sexual desires. Respect might lead an opponent to eschew
anti-gay slurs, but, like love, it might motivate such an opponent even more
strenuously and directly to attempt to change, or, failing that, to condemn
another‘s homosexual behavior. One sort of sympathy is potentially
associated with pity, which not only is in some tension with respect, but is
very much not what Nussbaum is urging on opponents of gay rights.37 It
may well be this sort of sympathy that leads some to join Nussbaum in
favoring laws against animal cruelty.38 This sort of sympathy may have
35

Id. at 1490. This is not to say I agree fully with Thomas‘s argument that the
constitutionality of an otherwise valid criminal law must be called into question if it is seen
to license private violence, a claim I do not think can be generalized beyond the consensual
criminal sodomy laws on which he focuses. Pedophiles too can attract private violence as a
result of the stigma attached to their crimes, but this does not constitutionally oblige us to
eliminate criminal penalties for sex with children rather than to offer better protection even
to convicted criminals from such private violence.
36
I have made a similar argument in the context of my critique of the German
abortion laws‘ mandatory counseling requirement, suggesting that perhaps ―it better befits
women‘s dignity as independent responsible legal actors to send them to jail for aborting,
rather than to mandatory counseling before they do so.‖ See Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism
and Fundamentalism in the Application of the German Abortion Laws, in CONSTITUTING
EQUALITY 93 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009)
37

As Katie Oliviero has observed, ―while it can incite the compassionate desire to
protect, vulnerability can also cue disgust, empathy‘s repressed other.‖ See Katie E.Oliviero,
Sensational Vulnerability: Constructions of Imperiled Citizenship, Intimacy and Personhood
in 21st Century Social Change Ch. 3 Sensational Nation: The Minutemen, Gendered
Vulnerability, and Exemplary Citizenship (Ph.D Dissertation) (draft of October 1, 2009 on
file with the author).
38

It does not follow from the adoption of an anti-cruelty agenda, for example by
the Humane Society, that the humanity of the animals, as opposed to that of the anti-cruelty
advocates, is at stake.
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already played a part in the development of the constitutional law of sexual
orientation, as John Jeffries‘s biography of Lewis Powell suggests. Jeffries,
a former Powell clerk, gave the following explanation of Powell‘s puzzling
insistence, in the course of deliberations in Bowers v. Hardwick, that he had
never met a homosexual, notwithstanding that a substantial number of his
clerks, including one in chambers during the term Bowers was before the
Court, were gay or lesbian:
In [Powell‘s] upbringing, homosexuality was at least a failing, if
not a sin. He later came to think of it as an abnormality, an
affliction for which its bearers should not be blamed but which
was vaguely scandalous. . . . He would not infer such misfortune
without direct knowledge. . . . Powell routinely turned a blind eye
to what he considered the failings of others. . . . His recollections
of those who worked for him always focused on their abilities
39
and achievements, not on their shortcomings.

Although the gay clerk in Powell‘s chambers for the Bowers case,
C. Cabell Chinnis, did not in so many words declare his own homosexuality
to Powell, he did answer Powell‘s question ―why don‘t homosexuals have
sex with women‖ by ―very bluntly sa[ying], ‗Justice Powell, a gay man
cannot have an erection to perform intercourse with a woman.‘‖ When
Powell responded ―that he thought sodomy required an erection, [Chinnis]
told him that gay men did, in fact, have erections with men but that was
different, they were sexually aroused.‖ What most struck Chinnis about
this interchange was ―that the concept of homosexuality had no content for
[Powell]. He had no frame of reference.‖40
Powell exhibited sympathy for gay people to what may have been
the best of his imaginative abilities, not only in asking the question of
Chinnis, but also in what he made of the answer. Powell noted after
conference in Bowers,
I would not argue that every person has a fundamental right to
engage in sodomy any time, any place. There are men who can
gratify their sexual desire only with another man. Given this fact,
I find it difficult lawfully to imprison such a person who confined
his abnormality to a private setting with a consenting homo . . .

39
40

JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 528 (1994).

JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB
THE SUPREME COURT 274 (2001).

PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V.
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Possibly I could Remand to determine whether Hardwick suffers
41
from this abnormality.

Powell even ―raised the possibility that the Constitution might
protect homosexual relationships that resemble marriage—stable,
monogamous relationships involving members of the same sex,‖ but was
talked out of this approach by his Mormon clerk, Mike Mosman, who
warned that
once you conclude that homosexual and heterosexual ―marriages‖
are of equal Constitutional status, you would necessarily suggest
that homosexuals have a right to adopt and raise children.
Further, states would have great difficulty justifying other
restrictions on homosexuality—such as no avowed homosexual
public school teachers—since the Constitution would place
homosexual and heterosexual relationships on a par with each
other. These possibilities suggest that the ―marriage‖ idea has too
many implications for other cases that you might want to decide
42
differently.
41

Handwritten notes by Justice Powell, dated April 3, 1986, from Powell archives,
Bowers v. Hardwick file, Washington & Lee. See Case, Of “This” and “That,” supra note 3,
at 91, n.71 (―Could we view homosexuals like drug addicts in the Netherlands, entitled to
their fix once they can demonstrate they can‘t shake the habit? Or like prostitutes who can
ply their trade once they register?‖).
42

See Case, Of “This” and “That,” supra note 3, at 107–08, n.140 (quoting Memo
dated April 1, 1986, identified in Powell‘s hand as ―Prepared for me by Mike after we had
discussed this troublesome case,‖ from Powell archives, Bowers v. Hardwick file,
Washington & Lee.). Before this memo, most of the worries Powell articulated concerning
the implications of a victory for Hardwick and the absence of a ―limiting principle‖
concerned the substantive due process parade of horribles, rather than implications sounding
in equal protection. Both Powell‘s own notes worrying about the absence of a ―limiting
principle‖ and Mosman‘s earlier memo dated March 29, 1986, had repeatedly expressed
concern that the result of the Court‘s ruling for Hardwick might be ―unchecked sexual
freedom, including prostitution because ‗no limiting principle comes to mind.‘‖ See JOYCE
MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME
COURT 298 (2001) (observing that Powell‘s handwritten notes ask about a due process
parade of horribles such as ―Bigamy? Incest? Prostitution? Adultery?‖ and not an equal
protection parade of horribles such as ―Homosexual marriage? Homosexual teachers?
Homosexual soldiers? Adoption by homosexuals?‖). The hints that Powell might have been
most willing to protect homosexual relationships for which he himself appears to have used
the term marriage are a fascinating contrast to the conventional progress of debates on the
subject, in which marriage is the very last thing to attract support, with many persons who
favor employment non-discrimination and tolerate homosexual sexual conduct and gay and
lesbian parenting still balking at recognition of gay couples. For further discussion, see Case,
Of “This” and “That,” supra note 3, at 107.
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In the end, Powell‘s sympathy extended only so far as to lead him
to say, in a separate concurring opinion, that were Georgia to enforce the
letter of its sodomy law and imprison someone like Michael Hardwick ―for
a single private, consensual act of sodomy‖ it ―would create a serious
Eighth Amendment issue.‖43
The constitutional case that best fits Nussbaum‘s trajectory from
disgust to humanity is Romer v. Evans.44 As Nussbaum details in her new
book, Paul Cameron was hired as a consultant in the crafting and defense of
Colorado‘s Amendment 2,45 and his brand of disgust is on the surface of
some of the literature circulated in support of the ballot initiative that added
Amendment 2 to the Colorado constitution.46 The politics of humanity, by
contrast, were front and center when the case reached the U.S. Supreme
Court. Indeed, as I have previously noted, Romer may have marked the
turning point in the trajectory of Justice Kennedy, author of the majority
opinion in both Romer and Lawrence:
In atmospheric terms, what being confronted with Amendment 2
may have done for the Court in general and Justice Kennedy in
particular is to cause them to think of gay rights in terms of a
bashed gay person in Colorado potentially bleeding to death in
the streets in front of a hospital that would not admit him and left
with potentially no state recourse against the bigots who bashed
him, the police who declined to stop them, and the hospital
prepared to let him die. [I take this image fairly directly from the
oral argument in Romer, at which the questioning Justices, by
means of examples much like this, struggled to understand the
scope and implications of Amendment 2‘s sweeping language for
the lives of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in Colorado.] This is a
much better image for the future of litigation for the rights of
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals than the image of Michael Hardwick
in his bedroom with his one-night-stand‘s penis in his mouth….
From what can be gauged from his opinions and public
statements, Justice Kennedy more than most Justices is often
motivated by a visceral sense of what is unjust. . . . So one way
for gays and lesbians to keep winning may be for them to be able
vividly to present themselves as victims of injustice, not, in the
43

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring).

44

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

45

NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, supra note 1, at .102.

46

Id. at 102.
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future, necessarily as the abject outlaws Amendment 2 would
have made them, but with the ―dignity‖ the Court vouchsafed
47
them in Lawrence.

Given her participation in the case as an expert witness on ancient
attitudes toward homosexuality, it is understandable that Romer centrally
shapes Nussbaum‘s view of the constitutional law of sexual orientation.48
Romer is no doubt an important case, and, in ways I have previously
explored, can be seen to lead directly to the equally important Lawrence
case.49 But Romer is also in many ways an anomalous case, presenting few
of the difficult problems the constitutional law of sexual orientation has
faced and will face in the future. Justice Kennedy was quite right to begin
his questioning at oral argument with,50 and to include as a central feature
of his majority opinion, the observation that Amendment 2

47
Case, Of “This” and “That,” supra note 3, at 105–6. I continue to believe, as I
said in 2003, ―that (1) sexual minorities should not have to be cast as abject victims in order
to gain the Court‘s solicitude, and (2) former Advocate publisher David Goodstein had a
point when he said, ‗Never forget one thing: What this movement is about is fucking.‘‖ Id. at
n.134.
48
In addition to her participation in Romer, Nussbaum‘s work on India may have
led her to focus on disgust. Not only does the analogy of disgust for dalits play a significant
role in From Disgust to Humanity, supra note 1, 21–23, a recent Delhi High Court decision
striking down a criminal sodomy law comes closer than any U.S. decision I know to
following the model Nussbaum‘s book assumes. Naz Found. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
WP(C) No.7455/2001 (July 2, 2009). The Delhi High Court insists in its decision that
―[p]ublic disapproval or disgust for a certain class of persons can in no way serve to uphold
the constitutionality of a statute.‖ Id. at 22. The court then rejects the argument that ―Indian
society considers homosexuality to be repugnant, immoral and contrary to the cultural norms
of the country.‖ Id. at 24. Interestingly, the Delhi High Court explicitly included in the ―class
of vulnerable people that is continually victimized and directly affected by‖ the law in
question not only ―the gay community‖ but ―MSM‖ (men having sex with men) and ―transgendered individuals.‖ Id. at 7, 6.
49
See, e.g., Case, Of “This” and “That,” supra note 3, at 105, n.132 (2003)
(noting that ―Scalia‘s dissent insisting that Bowers and Romer could not both stand backfired
on Scalia‖ because ―the Justices in the majority in Romer were given, in the connection that
dissent drew between Bowers and Amendment 2, a further reason to call the legitimacy of
Bowers into question‖).
50
Transcript of Oral Argument, 1995 WL 605822 (U.S.) at *3, Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (―Here, the classification seems to be adopted for its own sake. I‘ve
never seen a case like this. . . . Here, the classification is adopted to fence out, in the
Colorado supreme court‘s words, the class for all purposes, and I‘ve never seen a statute like
that.‖).
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identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them
protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from
51
the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.

Among Romer‘s anomalies as a gay rights case is that it is squarely
about identities, not about acts or agendas. Amendment 2 on its face
explicitly targets ―Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.‖ It does
not limit itself to targeting homosexual ―conduct, practices or
relationships.‖52 It also does not concern itself with classification by sexual
orientation more generally, leaving intact, for example, those portions of the
local Colorado sexual orientation non-discrimination laws that protect
heterosexuals against discrimination.53 It then takes the ―class of persons‖
identified by ―homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation‖ and removes the
protection of the laws from them wholesale. As Kennedy rightly held:
Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. . . . A
54
State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.

It is important to note, first, that no class of persons, ―even the most
heinous felons convicted under the most unimpeachable of criminal laws,
could constitutionally have the protection of the laws removed from them
on so wholesale a basis as that found in Amendment 2.‖55 To say that the
United States Constitution prevents Colorado from conferring outlaw or
pariah status on homosexuals does not distinguish homosexuals from
pedophiles, necrophiliacs, or mass murderers. To say they cannot be made
strangers to a state‘s laws does not make them favorites of the laws. Nor

51

Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.

52

COLO. CONST. amend. 2 (2002) (cited in Romer, 517 U.S. at 624). This alone
puts Amendment 2 dangerously close to the constitutionally prohibited category of status
offense. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding unconstitutional the
criminalization of the status of being a drug addict).
53
After its passage, for example, a heterosexual job applicant in Denver could still
file a complaint pursuant to local ordinance if she had been denied employment or housing
on grounds of her heterosexuality.
54

Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.

55

Case, Of “This” and “That,” supra note 3, at 93.
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does it put sexual orientation where Nussbaum wants to see it, on a par with
race and sex as ―warrant[ing] some form of heightened scrutiny.‖56
Had the language of Amendment 2 been slightly more careful and
less sweeping, had it actually done only what its proponents claimed it was
intended to do, which was to trump local Colorado laws protecting gays and
lesbians against private discrimination in employment, housing, and public
accommodation in cities such as Aspen, Boulder, and Denver,57 the case
might have come out differently, depriving Nussbaum and other gay rights
advocates of an enormously useful precedent. Some evidence for this
limiting interpretation of Romer is the fate on remand after Romer of
Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinnati.58 The anti-gay-rights provision at
issue in Equality Foundation differed from that in Romer first in being an
amendment to a city charter, not to a state constitution, thereby eliminating
from the case the issue of the placement of unusual procedural hurdles in
the path of future gay rights advocates, an issue which had been crucial to
the Supreme Court of Colorado‘s analysis of Amendment 2. Perhaps more
importantly, the Cincinnati charter provision challenged by Equality
Foundation, unlike Amendment 2, did not purport to deprive gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals of any ―claim of discrimination,‖ but merely to deny them
―any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other
preferential treatment.‖59 This led the Sixth Circuit to uphold the charter
provision on remand, on the grounds that it ―merely removed municipally
enacted special protection from gays and lesbians,‖60 a holding the U.S.
Supreme Court did not overturn.61
One way of exploring Romer‘s limits for Nussbaum‘s purposes, as
well as to examine how much opposition to legal recognition of gay rights
can fairly be said to rest on disgust alone, is to examine Scalia‘s dissents in
Romer and Lawrence in conjunction with Patrick Devlin‘s arguments in The
Enforcement of Morals. Tellingly, Scalia begins his Romer dissent by
accusing the Court of having ―mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.‖62
56

NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 114.

57

See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.

58

Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and
remanded 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
59

Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 1997).

60

Id. at 301.

61

Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998).

62

Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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(Had he been addressing Nussbaum instead, he might have substituted the
emotion of disgust for that of anger, and instead accused her of mistaking a
Kulturkampf for a fit of projectile vomiting.) Setting forth his sense of what
is at stake in this Kulturkampf,63 Scalia describes Amendment 2 as not
motivated by ―a ‗bare . . . desire to harm‘ homosexuals,‖ rather as ―a
modest attempt by seemingly [sic] tolerant Coloradans to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.‖64 Scalia‘s framing
of the issues at stake raises several related but distinct questions of central
importance to Nussbaum‘s project: What, if any, constitutionally
permissible legal avenues now remain open to opponents of ―the
homosexual agenda‖ and what, if any, constitutionally cognizable
justifications remain available for them to mobilize in aid of their resistance
if disgust and a bare desire to harm have been ruled out? To the extent that
the opponents‘ arguments are now on their face being made with ordinary
public-regarding reasons, what difference if any should it make whether
disgust underlies them? And is it the case that there is no feasible
intermediate stopping point in law and policy between attaching moral
opprobrium to homosexuality and embracing it fully as morally acceptable?
Although he fails to acknowledge the ways in which Amendment 2,
by on its face targeting gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals on the basis of
orientation alone for disadvantage, is an exception, Scalia correctly
describes the core of the current Kulturkampf over homosexuality as about
acts and agendas rather than identities:
Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any
human being or class of human beings. But I had thought that one
could consider certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for
example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit
65
even ―animus‖ toward such conduct.

Even if we ratchet down the level of opposition to homosexual
conduct considerably below what Scalia calls ―animus,‖ Archbishop of
Canterbury Rowan Williams‘s recent observation in the context of the
disputes concerning homosexuality that threaten to divide his Anglican
63

In continuing to use Scalia‘s chosen German term ―Kulturkampf‖ rather than the
English term ―culture war‖ often invoked in this context, I intend to stress that my focus here
is on the aspects of the culture war over homosexuality being fought in and through the law.
64

Id.

65

Id. at 644.
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Communion still has resonance for issues of sexual orientation in U.S.
constitutional law: ―The question is not a simple one of human rights or
human dignity. It is that a certain choice of lifestyle has certain
consequences.‖66
The disadvantaging of blacks simply on account of their race and
women simply on account of their sex led to heightened scrutiny for race
and sex in American constitutional law, just as the disadvantaging of
members of backward castes in India, in ways that fit well with Nussbaum‘s
trajectory from disgust to humanity, led to special protections for them
under the Indian constitution.67 But Kennedy is right to see Amendment 2
as quite exceptional. A small minority of outstanding legal restrictions on
the basis of sexual orientation focus primarily or exclusively on homosexual
identity; these typically involve not ―a broad and undifferentiated
disability‖68 but one that, however important, is narrow. And even these do
not rest on status alone, but tend to define status in terms of conduct. Thus,
for example, the military‘s Don‘t Ask Don‘t Tell policy (―DADT‖)
provides that
servicemembers will be separated for homosexual conduct. . . .
Homosexual conduct is a homosexual act, a statement by the
servicemember that demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage
in homosexual acts, or a homosexual marriage or attempted
69
marriage.

66
Rowan Williams, Communion, Covenant and our Anglican Future: Reflections
on the Episcopal Church‘s 2009 General Convention from the Archbishop of Canterbury for
the Bishops, Clergy and Faithful of the Anglican Communion, Anglican Communion News
Service
(July
28,
2009),
http://www.anglicancommunion.org/acns/news.cfm/
2009/7/28/ACNS4641 (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).. For my critique of Williams‘s Reflections,
see Mary Anne Case, Homosexuality and the Anglican debate, in The Immanent
Frame, SSRC (2009) at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2009/08/04/homosexuality-and-the-anglicandebate/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
67
See, e.g. INDIA CONST. art. 243D (reserving seats in every Panchayat for
members of scheduled castes).
68

Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.

69
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin‘s July 19, 1993 Memorandum to the Joint
Chiefs, cited in Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment
on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1661
n.77 (1993). In earlier work, I explored in detail the relationship between act and identity in
DADT. See id. at 1661 and Case, Of “This” and “That,” supra note 3, at 90.
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According to Scalia, opponents of homosexuality, when they are in
the political majority, should be able to harness government to discourage
or to express opposition to homosexual conduct. At the very least, however,
in his view, these opponents should be protected in their private choices to
avoid associating with those who engage in homosexual conduct. As he
says in his Lawrence dissent:
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters
for their children, as teachers in their children‘s schools, or as
boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves
and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral
70
and destructive.

Scalia targets the confused fault line between ―equal rights‖ and
―special rights‖ for homosexuals when he describes in his Romer dissent the
Association of American Law Schools‘ sexual orientation nondiscrimination policy for employers seeking to interview law students at
member schools as follows:
The interviewer may refuse to offer a job because the applicant is
a Republican; because he is an adulterer; because he went to the
wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong country club; because
he eats snails; because he is a womanizer; because she wears realanimal fur; or even because he hates the Chicago Cubs. But if the
interviewer should wish not to be an associate or partner of an
applicant because he disapproves of the applicant‘s
homosexuality, then he will have violated the pledge which the
Association of American Law Schools requires all its member
schools to exact from job interviewers: ―assurance of the
71
employer‘s willingness‖ to hire homosexuals.

70

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

71
Romer, 517 U.S. at 652–53 (1996). I have previously noted the analogies
between Scalia‘s list and that drawn up by gay rights pioneer Franklin Kameny, who asked
in a petition for certiorari, after noting that ―some people consider dancing, liquor and even
drinking coffee and tea immoral,‖ ―[w]ill they next year, term as immoral left-handedness,
red-headedness, a liking for horsemeat steaks, or membership in either political party or none
at all?‖ Kameny v. Brucker, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27 (filed Jan 27, 1961)
(challenging dismissal of astronomer from federal civil service job for being a homosexual
and for having failed fully to disclose the reason for his arrest in a San Francisco men‘s
room); see also Case, Of “This” and “That,” supra note 3, at 114 (2003).
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Several things are worthy of note about the analogies Scalia draws
to discrimination against homosexuals. First, the items on his list refer
generally to activities or beliefs, not identities tout court. Moreover, they
are of the sort to which some would apply the adage ―de gustibus non est
disputandum‖ (generally translated into English as ―There‘s no accounting
for taste‖). ―Disgust‖ has at its root the same Latin noun—etymologically
disgust is dis-taste. Both taste for and aversion to an activity or belief may
be difficult to account for, and prejudice in favor of or against any of the
items on Scalia‘s list in a candidate‘s background may therefore seem an
arbitrary, if generally legally permissible, basis for choosing among job
candidates.72 But difficult though it often may be to justify investing a job
applicant‘s choice of prep school, country club, or team rooting interest
with moral significance,73 the same cannot be said of decisions about what
animal products to eat74 or wear or whom to have sex with or vote for. Even
Nussbaum should concede that more than mere disgust can motivate, for
example, someone committed to animal rights and progressive politics to
wish to avoid associating, even professionally, with a meat-eating, furwearing, card-carrying Republican. Nussbaum has previously, in the
context of arguing against criminal prohibitions on prostitution, offered
cogent arguments against viewing sex acts as special.75 I would be
interested in hearing whether and why she now thinks, to the contrary, that
sexuality really should be special in constitutional law and in antidiscrimination law more broadly. As Liz Emens asked in her comments on
my paper at Columbia‘s Nussbaum symposium, is the politics of humanity
Nussbaum recommends in her new book ―a sexual politics in any
distinctive way, or . . . ultimately, is it a politics of everything without any
72
One increasingly proposed global response takes the form of statutory protection
of employees in both the public and private sector against discharge for legal off-duty
conduct. Although smokers‘ advocates have been most prominent in lobbying for such
protections, the statutory protections have been mobilized to defend those discharged for
sexual conduct as well. Colorado had such a statute in place at the time of the Amendment 2
controversy. See COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-402.5 (Supp. 1995).
73
It may matter in this regard if the ―wrong country club‖ is the one that admits
blacks and Jews or the one that excludes them.
74

See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Richard Posner‟s Just-So Stories: The Phallacies of
Sex and Reason, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 229, 256 (1993) (arguing, in opposition to Richard
Posner, ―that eating hardly provides a model, either historically or today, of a morally
indifferent human activity that can be explained by a few standard economic concepts‖).
75
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for
Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693 (1998).
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specialness to sex?‖ Although the term ―special rights‖ has been terribly
misused in the context of sexual orientation, it is worth asking what is
unique about homosexuality in particular—as compared with other sexual
practices, tastes or predilections as well as with other life-choices or
inclinations—that apparently leads Nussbaum to wish to grant it special
protections. If it is permissible for people to lose jobs on account of their
sexual promiscuity or celibacy, let alone their vegetarianism or
libertarianism, why not for their homosexual practices?76
Nussbaum would, I suspect, argue that being gay is more like being
a Catholic than being a Republican or a carnivore. She proposes carrying
over into the area of sexual orientation ―the norm in the area of religion,
where we are used to the idea that we should live on terms of respect with
people whose choices we think bad, or even sinful, and to the related idea
that such deeply meaningful personal choices require the protection, for all,
of a sphere of personal freedom.‖77 But she does not explain in any detail—
and I am at a loss to understand—how she thinks such a norm would work
in practice. What helped the free exercise and establishment clauses work
so well in tandem to maintain religious peace and freedom in the U.S.
context is that, as it happens, most of the deepest disagreements between
major religious groups in the United States in prior centuries happened to be
about what to believe and how to worship rather than how to live in society.
One major exception, the Mormon practice of polygamy, was not in fact
tolerated, but promptly and harshly quashed, as Scalia notes in his Romer
dissent.78 A more minor exception, the use of controlled mind-altering
drugs in religious ritual, was held by the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Scalia, not to require a religious exemption from a general law making use
of such drugs illegal. Importantly for present purposes, the Smith case did
not involve a criminal prosecution, but the question of whether a
religiously-motivated user of peyote who had been fired by a private
76
For examples of how moral disapproval of a wide variety of adult consensual
sexual behaviors apart from homosexuality, even in the absence of a criminal law backing up
this disapproval, still plays a major role in many employment and family law decisions, see
Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 112
(2003).
77

NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, supra note 1, at xv.

78
Romer, 517 U.S. at 648 (1996); cf. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS 114 (1965) (arguing that either polygamy or monogamy or free love might
plausibly be the basis for a well-functioning society, so long as there was ―some common
agreement on what is right and what is wrong. . . . Whether the new belief is better or worse
than the old, it is the interregnum of disbelief that is perilous.‖).
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employer on account of his peyote use could be denied state unemployment
compensation.79
One way of examining whether opposition to homosexuality by the
likes of Devlin really can be reduced to nothing but disgust is to consider an
analogy to opposition to the legalization of such controlled, mind-altering
drugs as peyote, marijuana or alcohol. For some, consumption of marijuana,
like alcohol, is sacramental; others, who do not consume it as part of a
narrowly religious ceremony, still claim spiritual benefits from its use;
some see its use as a casual taste or preference, others see it as a central
lifestyle choice, while still others credibly claim significant health benefits
from its use, such as the alleviation of chronic nausea. Unlike alcohol,
marijuana is opposed by few for purely religious reasons, nor is disgust at it
much in evidence among its opponents ; but many opponents of legalization
do stress the social harms overindulgence in it may cause and still others
take the position that any clouding of one‘s judgement or one‘s cognitive
faculties is to be avoided. U.S. constitutional law has come nowhere near
recognizing a generalized constitutional right to be free of criminal
penalties for using marijuana or other intoxicating substances, on Millean or
any other grounds. Nor has it endorsed civil constitutional antidiscrimination claims by drug users, even when the drugs are legally
obtained.80
Devlin seems to see homosexuality as akin to a contagion81 or
addiction, like drugs or gambling. A sex club for him would be like an
79

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

80

See, e.g., New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding
Transit Authority‘s categorical refusal to employ narcotic drug users as applied to
participants in a methadone maintenance program).
81

Rehnquist, who joined Scalia in his Romer and Lawrence dissents, also once
used the language of contagion to describe the need to protect against the spread of
homosexuality. In dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Ratchford v. Gay Lib, he
claimed that the question presented of whether a support group for gay students had a
constitutional right to official recognition from the University of Missouri as a student
organization despite the University‘s concerns that it would ―tend to expand homosexual
behavior which will cause increased violations of [the State‘s sodomy statute],‖ was ―akin to
[asking] whether those suffering from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of
quarantine regulations, to associate together and with others who do not presently have
measles, in order to urge repeal of a state law providing that measle sufferers be
quarantined.‖ 434 U.S. 1080, 1081, 1084 (1978). Even in this early case, I would argue,
more than disgust is at issue, however—the reason why the measles sufferers analogized to
gay people are to be quarantined is not because measles is a seen as a disgusting disease, but
because it is seen as both harmful and at risk of spreading. The argument in Ratchford
sounds more in pathology than in disgust.
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opium den or a shooting gallery, and his concerns include ―corrupting the
youth.‖82 In part this may be the result of his making the now unfashionable
assumption that sexual orientation is not innate and fixed, but at least to
some extent learned and malleable, with its appeal closer to the
universalizing than the minoritizing end of the spectrum, so that more than
a few youths could be tempted by homosexuality, as they could be by
gambling, drugs or drink, even though a minority might have a greater
predisposition to addiction than most others. Society, not just the
individuals concerned, would in Devlin‘s view be concretely harmed if too
many individuals in it were ―constantly drunk, drugged, or debauched‖ and
in consequence ―not likely to be useful members of the community.‖83
For Devlin, it appears, prohibiting homosexual acts, as well as
prohibiting drug use, may be like requiring the wearing of motorcycle
helmets—the negative social externalities offer some justification for
restricting the liberty of individuals. Devlin‘s argument here has resonance
with the historical argument that mutually consensual private violence that
led to actual bodily harm could be criminally prosecuted if the harm
amounted to maiming, because a maimed individual could no longer
effectively bear arms in support of his country. Such an individual might be
able to consent to the harm done to him personally, but not to the resulting
societal harm caused by his disability. Interestingly, continuing public
policy concerns about both maiming and corrupting the youth were raised
by members of the British House of Lords in the so-called Spanner case,
R.v. Brown, as justifications for continuing to allow criminal prosecution of
―consensual sado-masochistic homosexual encounters which occasioned
actual bodily harm.‖84 Those who no longer think youth are at risk of
―corruption‖ into homosexuality, including Nussbaum, should ask
themselves whether their plea for tolerance, including not only the removal
of criminal penalties but protection through anti-discrimination laws, would
extend to minority sexual tastes other than homosexuality, such as hardcore SM.
82

PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS v (1965).

83

Id. at 106 .

84

See R.v. Brown, [1993] 2 All ER 75 (House of Lords) (―Consensual sadomasochistic homosexual encounters which occasioned actual bodily harm to the victim‖
could be prosecuted as criminal assaults ―notwithstanding the victim‘s consent to the acts
inflicted on him, because public policy required that society be protected by criminal
sanctions against a cult of violence which contained the danger of the proselytisation and
corruption of young men and the potential for the infliction of serious injury‖).
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One reason Devlin associates homosexuality with negative
externalities may be because Devlin cannot seem to imagine that gay sex
can be domesticated, perhaps because he wrote so long before serious and
widespread talk of same-sex marriage or the gaby boom. He might today
join conservative gay male proponents of same-sex marriage in urging that,
far from being prevented from marrying, gays, and in particular gay men,
should be ―expected‖ to marry and should be ―disapproved of or pitied‖ if
they fail to settle down with a lawfully wed spouse.85 Thus, Devlin might
well be completely wrong about the social costs of homosexuality, but he
makes a case concerning such social costs using the same sorts of public
reasons others still successfully use to justify drug laws, reasons I do not
think can fairly be equated with disgust. There is a world of difference
between Nussbaum‘s claim as a normative matter that the law should not be
built on disgust and her descriptive assertion that as a matter of fact any law
disfavoring homosexuality must necessarily be grounded only on disgust.
Instead of analogizing to debates about controlled intoxicating
substances, Nussbaum analogizes debates about homosexuality to debates
about the eating of pork. This is convenient for her argument, not only
because the discussion of pork has a Millean pedigree,86 but because, unlike
some other religiously based food restrictions, the prohibition on pork for
both Jews and Muslims does not purport to rest on any ground other than
religious ritual or the command of God. What if the analogy were instead to
prohibitions on the eating of all meat? When adopted by religious
adherents, such as Hindus or Buddhists or Catholics during Lent, the
prohibition on meat can sometimes be seen as motivated only by ritual or
the command of God, but, even for some religious believers and certainly
for those many people who are vegetarians without a religious basis, other
reasons are frequently given, including commitment to non-violence, to
reduced environmental impact, to the avoidance of animal exploitation or
cruelty, and to bodily health and purity. These latter reasons Nussbaum
must surely admit to be ―public arguments bearing on the lives of all
citizens in a decent society,‖87 not merely ―religiously grounded
abhorrence‖ such as that of Muslims and Jews for pork.88 I presume
85
See Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse? The Case for Gay (and Straight)
Marriage, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996, reprinted in Andrew Sullivan, SAME SEX
MARRIAGE PRO AND CON: A READER 169, 180.
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Nussbaum would not see a law banning the slaughter of all animals for their
meat as impermissible in the same way she assumes a ban on pork alone
would be, even if passage of such a ban were spearheaded by religiously
motivated vegetarians. Nussbaum needs to demonstrate and not merely
tacitly assume that bans on, for example, same-sex marriage or sodomy, are
more like bans on pork than bans on the slaughter of all meat.
Instead, she completely ignores some of the arguments to which she
should respond. For example, she confidently makes the categorical
assertion that the same-sex marriage debate ―is really not about whether
same-sex relationships can involve the content of marriage. . . . Certainly
none would deny that gays and lesbians are capable of sexual intimacy.‖ 89
Is she blind to or just blinking the fact that this is precisely what natural law
theorists like Robert George, Germain Grisez and John Finnis do
vehemently deny? For these theorists, not all sexual activity is ―sexual
intimacy.‖ As they see it, only uncontracepted vaginal intercourse—the
―one flesh union‖ of ―a male and a female body in a way that is suitable for
reproduction‖ 90—can truly be called sexual intimacy. What gays and
lesbians may perceive as sexual intimacy is, according to these theorists, an
illusion: ―each one‘s experience of intimacy is private and incommunicable,
and is no more a common good than is the mere experience of sexual
arousal and orgasm.‖91 It may well be that it is not possible to hold such
views without religious faith to ground them, but assuming these views out
of existence is not enough to refute them or conclusively demonstrate their
necessary reliance on a religious foundation. Not all those who think it is
wrong and ought to be illegal to contaminate the human body with meat or
alcohol or mind-altering drugs see the body as a temple in the religious
sense. Nor would it make much sense to ascribe their aversion to meat or
alcohol or drugs simply to disgust. Similarly, I can imagine that some who,
for example, find anal sex objectionable do so on purely religious grounds,
some out of disgust, some out of genuine concern for the risk of physical
trauma and infection, but some because they view such acts as inconsistent
with their non-religious sense of the dignity of the human body. Millean
and constitutional arguments may be enough to prevent such people from
89

Id. at 130.

90
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turning their objections into criminal prohibitions on adult consensual anal
sex, but constitutional anti-discrimination protections will not necessarily
follow, and even with respect to the criminal law there is some room for
doubt in that no general criminal sodomy statute ever came close to the sort
of narrow tailoring that has allowed the survival post-Lawrence of criminal
prohibitions on certain sexual acts.92
Consider in this regard once again Nussbaum‘s approval in earlier
work of the criminalization of necrophilia and other use of ―religiously
charged objects for sexual purposes,‖ quoted above.93 As I understand it,
Nussbaum does not limit her approval of criminalization in such cases to
situations where a conventional property interest is violated—it is not just
when a legal stranger, but also when ―the surviving spouse has sex with the
corpse‖ that Nussbaum thinks outrage justifies criminalization.94 It does not
seem to matter to her argument whether the surviving spouse does this in
the spirit of rape or of loving farewell; nor does it seem to matter whether or
not the decedent would have approved or disapproved, felt violated or
honored or indifferent, had she known what her spouse would do with her
corpse. Why does the decision to have sex with a corpse seem to Nussbaum
more appropriate for legal regulation to the extent of criminal prohibition
than other decisions as to its disposition, such as the decision to embalm or
cremate it? Public health concerns do not seem to underlie the outragemotivated legal restrictions she is prepared to endorse. Nussbaum seems
tacitly to be accepting here a view of the sacredness of the human body and
of the deleterious social and moral consequences its sexual misuse can
embody or engender. The arguments she seems to endorse in this
connection are ones I have difficulty distinguishing from those some
opponents of homosexuality make about homosexual sex.
92

See, e.g., Lambda Legal, State Criminal Statutes on HIV Exposure,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/publications/general/state-criminal-statutes-hiv.html
(last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
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Id. at 157. It is less clear whether conventional property interests place a limit in
Nussbaum‘s view on the permissibility of placing restrictions on the use of other ―religiously
charged objects for sexual purposes.‖ Id. at 155. For example, one can purchase,from
Divine-Interventions.Com, in addition to a ―Baby Jesus butt plug‖ to be the ―the centerpiece
of . . . [a] Dildo Creche,‖ a crucified Christ, Virgin Mary, Buddha, Moses or Satan dildo (but
interestingly no Prophet Mohammed). Divine-Interventions.Com, Baby Jesus Butt Plug,
http://www.divine-interventions.com/baby.php (last visited Feb. 1, 2010). In a country where
the First Amendment precludes blasphemy laws, it is difficult to see how outrage can be the
basis for legally preventing the purchaser of even a more conventional crucifix from using it
for masturbatory purposes.

114

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 19:1

It is important to recognize that, in the aftermath of Lawrence, few
of the open questions in the American constitutional law of sexual
orientation are Millean. Lawrence put the criminalization of private,
consensual adult homosexual activity out of bounds as a way of expressing
disapproval of homosexuality. Private adult consensual homosexual activity
now has a status in American law somewhere between necrophilia and
interracial marriage. Not only did Loving v. Virginia hold it to be a
constitutional violation of Equal Protection and Due Process for the state to
criminalize interracial marriage or deny a marriage license to an interracial
couple,95 the subsequent case of Bob Jones University held a private
religious university‘s policy against interracial dating to be so contrary to
the public policy against race discrimination that the Internal Revenue
Service could deny the university a tax exemption otherwise generally
available to educational institutions.96 As I understand Nussbaum‘s politics
of humanity when it comes to sexual orientation, it certainly would require
that prohibitions on same-sex marriage, like prohibitions on interracial
marriage, be held unconstitutional. Would it also, in Nussbaum‘s view,
require that opposition to same-sex marriage, or to homosexual conduct
more generally, be against the public policy of the United States, in the way
that opposition to interracial marriage has been held to be?97
In 1993, the commissioners of Cobb County, Georgia adopted
resolutions proclaiming, inter alia, ―that ‗the traditional family structure‘ is
in accord with community standards, . . . that ‗lifestyles advocated by the
gay community‘ are incompatible with those standards . . . and that Cobb
County would not fund ‗activities which seek to contravene these existing
community standards.‘‖98 Today far more units of local government are
likely to proclaim Gay Pride Month than to join Cobb County in declaring
themselves to be in official disapproval of homosexuality. Even in the
95
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1990s, the principal identifiable concrete effect of Cobb County‘s
resolutions was to penalize not ―the gay community,‖ but Cobb County
itself: the Olympic torch, originally scheduled to travel through Cobb
County, took a detour around it because the Olympic organizers wished to
distance themselves from the county‘s announced opposition to ―the gay
community.‖99 I suspect, however, that Nussbaum would not see allowing
local governmental units the option to announce themselves either pro- or
anti-gay as a desirable compromise allowing potential residents and visitors
to sort themselves according to the public policy with respect to
homosexuality they prefer. She might see those gay people already resident
in Cobb County at the time of the passage of a resolution disapproving of
the ―lifestyles advocated by the[ir] community‖ as akin to Dissenters in a
polity with an Established Church. As Justice O‘Connor put it in an
Establishment Clause case:
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
100
the opposite message.

It is, however, far easier for units of government, from the federal
government down to the level of the school board, to avoid any
endorsement or disapproval of a religion than to remain similarly agnostic
or evenhanded with respect to ―family structure[s]‖ or ―lifestyles.‖ There
are a wide variety of contexts in which government necessarily takes some
position on family structure. Consider, for example, the myriad legal
questions concerning adoption by same-sex couples or gay individuals. The
current gamut of state public policy on gay adoption ranges from Florida,
until recently the only state in the union with a categorical ban on adoption
by homosexuals, to Massachusetts, where Catholic Charities withdrew from
the adoption business rather than comply with state sexual orientation nondiscrimination requirements for licensed adoption agencies.101 Adoption
orders, once issued, present issues of full faith and credit as between states
with radically different public policies. But Nussbaum‘s new book does not
99
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address any of the constitutional questions the variety of public policies on
gay adoption raises, not only for gay individuals and couples, but also for
children, for social service agencies opposed to adoption by homosexuals,
and for federalism.
Another seemingly intractable context in this regard is the
curriculum of public schools. From the nineteenth century Bible wars,
through the twentieth century conflicts over prayer in the schools, to the
twenty-first century disputes over the teaching of evolution,102 courts have
regularly been asked to resolve constitutional questions concerning
establishment and free exercise in the public schools. Yet it is certainly
possible to imagine a public school curriculum that can avoid deeply
contentious and constitutionally problematic discussion of religion. The
same cannot as readily be imagined for discussions of sexuality.
Issues related to what Scalia calls the homosexual agenda
inevitably arise, not only in classes specifically denominated sex-ed, but in
virtually every other aspect of the curriculum, from history and social
studies to biology and literature. In addition, public schools and other
government funded educational programs inevitably find themselves in the
business of teaching values, including civic values such as tolerance. Is
there, then, a way for schools to avoid sending either a message of
endorsement or a message of disapproval either to proponents or to
opponents of ―eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally
attached to homosexual conduct?‖103 So long as some see the mere mention
of same-sex relationships without explicit condemnation as connoting
approval and others would see the failure to mention such relationships as
connoting disapproval, I do not see how such a way can be found.
Consider, for example, the federal lawsuit brought by parents in
Massachusetts who objected that their local public school supplied first
graders with ―two books that portray diverse families, including families in
which both parents are of the same gender.‖104 In addition to violations of
their constitutional rights, the parents also claimed violation of the school‘s
statutory obligation to give them prior notice and the chance to opt-out of
any ―curriculum which primarily involves human sexual education or
102
Indeed, the same Cobb County that in 1993 resolved to disapprove of gay
lifestyles more found itself in federal court a dozen years later over the warning stickers
about the theory of evolution it wished to place in school textbooks. See Selman v. Cobb
County Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2005).
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human sexuality issues.‖105 As the First Circuit explained in upholding
dismissal of the parents‘ complaint, the components of the curriculum
which these books addressed were not sexual education or human sexuality,
but ―Family Life‖ and ―Interpersonal Relationships‖ as components of
―Social and Emotional Health.‖106 The books were used to teach the
students ―about the significance of the family on individuals and society‖
and to ―[d]escribe different types of families.‖107
Although the First Circuit found that the parents‘ rights had not
been violated, it stressed that inclusion of such gay-friendly materials was
discretionary with the school district and suggested that ―the plaintiffs may
seek recourse to the normal political processes for change in the town and
state.‖108 This solution might satisfy Scalia, who declared himself willing to
leave to the political process ―disputes over such matters as the introduction
into local schools of books teaching that homosexuality is an optional and
fully acceptable ‗alternative life style,‘‖109 but will it satisfy Nussbaum?
What if the political process determined to eliminate affirmative portrayals
of same-sex couples in government-funded educational materials, as U.S.
Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings did when she forced out of a
Public Broadcasting Service (―PBS‖) television series which had received
federal funding specifically to showcase the diversity of American families
an episode featuring a lesbian civilly-united couple from Vermont who run
a maple sugaring operation with their three children110 on the grounds that
―many parents would not want their young children exposed to the lifestyles portrayed in this episode?‖111 What if the political process goes
105

Id. at 92.

106

Id. at 91.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 107.
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beyond Spellings in requiring government funded education programs to
discourage homosexual conduct as an undesirable form of sexual
expression, as some federally funded marriage promotion and abstinenceonly education programs in states without same-sex marriage implicitly do
when they teach students that the only acceptable outlet for sexual activity
is within a legal marriage?
Not only does government funded speech concerning
homosexuality raise difficult questions, so does the collision of private
speech with governmental regulatory authority. The public schools have
been the locus in recent years of what might be called the T-shirt wars, with
a number of federal constitutional lawsuits addressing the general question
of whether ―a public high school [may] prohibit students from wearing Tshirts with messages that condemn and denigrate other students on the basis
of their sexual orientation,‖112 and specific questions as to whether a range
of T-shirt slogans from ―Homosexuality is Shameful ‗Romans 1:27‘‖113 to
―Straight Pride‖ and ―Be Happy, Not Gay‖114 qualify for such a prohibition.
That a number of the students wearing such T-shirts say they were
motivated to do so in response, not only to other students‘ messages
supportive of homosexuality, but also to official school messages of
tolerance for homosexuality,115 reinforces once again how difficult it is for
public schools to avoid being seen to take a position on the issue.
When units of government do endorse a message of tolerance or
non-discrimination with respect to homosexuality, how much protection
does the First Amendment offer individuals and groups who disagree?
Before her appointment to the Supreme Court, Sonia Sotomayor faced such
a question in a Second Circuit case challenging as the coercive suppression
of speech Staten Island Borough President Guy Molinari‘s letter to a
billboard company strongly condemning its decision to put up, under
contract with a religious group, billboards prominently displaying multiple
translations of Leviticus 18:22 (which reads, in the King James Version,
Spellings‘s decision look like constitutionally problematic viewpoint discrimination. For
further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier between
Government and Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV.381, 394-5.
112
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―Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind: it is an
abomination.‖) in ―Staten Island neighborhoods containing a significant
number of gay and lesbian residents.‖116 And her future colleagues on the
Supreme Court, in important cases such as Hurley117 and Boy Scouts v.
Dale118 have wrestled with conflicts between First Amendment freedom of
association and governmental commitment to non-discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation.
Given the multitude of difficult, fiercely-contested open
constitutional questions concerning sexual orientation at the intersection of
First Amendment guarantees of freedom of religion, speech and association,
it is puzzling that the only First Amendment issues Nussbaum‘s new book
discusses in any detail are those concerning the regulation of sex clubs and
public sex. Had Nussbaum discussed a case like Boy Scouts v. Dale in her
new book, it might be clearer whether, given that she believes disgust still
underlies all opposition to acceptance of homosexuality in private or public
policy, she thinks it is or is not a step in the right direction that, as she puts
it, disgust has ―gone underground.‖119 On the one hand, she might argue, as
some do with respect to overtly racist or sexist statements, that purging the
language of disgust from public discourse is the first step to making it
disappear from hearts and minds. On the other hand she might argue, as,
again, some do with respect to overtly racist or sexist statements, that
burying disgust-based arguments underground before they can effectively
be dispelled leads those whose opposition to homosexuality is indeed based
on disgust in a position of moral dumbfounding120—still as unshakably
convinced of the rightness of their opposition but unable to marshal
arguments in support of their position. Allowing disgust to be articulated
instead of driving it underground may help disentangle disgust-based
reasons from other reasons for disfavoring gay rights.
To say that all opposition to gay rights cannot be reduced to disgust
is not to say that I find the other reasons for opposition to be better. But
116
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their flaws cannot be addressed unless we face these reasons on their own
terms rather than dismissing them, as Nussbaum does, as mere disguised
disgust. Consider, for example, opposition to legal recognition of same-sex
marriage. The New York Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Robert
Smith, held that the following constituted a sufficient basis for not
extending civil marriage to same-sex couples:
The Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other
things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother
and a father. Intuition and experience suggest that a child benefits
from having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of
121
what both a man and a woman are like.

As a feminist theorist and a constitutional law scholar, I find this
rationale deeply disturbing.122 It seems to me directly contrary to the federal
constitutional prohibition on embodying in law any ―fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.‖123 As I have told
Smith (who is, I am ashamed to say, an old friend of mine), he must have
been assuming the Legislature wished to encourage more nudity in the
home, because any other assumptions about ―living models of what both a
man and a woman are like‖ would run afoul of federal constitutional
prohibitions on basing legal distinctions on sex stereotypes. Yet, however
serious the problems with the ―living models‖ rationale may be, it can
easily be understood ―without moving to the terrain of disgust and
contamination.‖124
The same can be said of another of Smith‘s arguments, the much
mocked claim that gays are ―too good‖ to need marriage125 because, while
heterosexuals can ―become parents as a result of accident or impulse,‖ gay
and lesbian couples can do so only after planning and deliberation and
hence have less need than unruly heterosexuals to be channeled into the
121
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stability of marriage for the sake of their children.126 (―The Legislature
could find that unstable relationships between people of the opposite sex
present a greater danger that children will be born into or grow up in
unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that
promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children
more.‖127) Again, whatever other flaws this argument may have, it is
directly contradictory to Nussbaum‘s assertion that ―[t]he only distinction
between unworthy heterosexuals and the class of gays and lesbians that can
possibly explain the difference in people‘s reaction [to their marriages] is
that the sex acts of the former do not disgust the majority, whereas the sex
acts of the latter do.‖128 Far from seeming disgusted by them, Smith goes
out of his way to acknowledge, not only the careful and thoughtful way in
which homosexuals become parents, but also ―that there has been serious
injustice in the treatment of homosexuals‖ and to speak favorably of New
York legislative responses such as the Sexual Orientation NonDiscrimination Act of 2002.129 But if, for Smith, homosexuals are, like
blacks, victims of a long history of unjust prejudice, women seem to remain
like children and imbeciles, in special need of the protection of the laws. He
seems much more interested in preserving sex role differentiation than in
putting gays down.
Smith insists that ―the traditional definition of marriage is not
merely a by-product of historical injustice. Its history is of a different
kind.‖130 In my view he can only reach this conclusion by focusing
exclusively on the injustice of exclusion on gay and lesbian couples and
ignoring any historical injustice to heterosexual women. Justice Johnson‘s
concurring and dissenting opinion in the Vermont same-sex marriage case,
by tracing aspects of the history of the legal regulation of marriage Smith
ignores, makes clear why ―[v]iewing the discrimination [in the marriage
laws] as sex-based . . . is important.‖131 As she correctly observes, the
discrimination is ―a vestige of sex-role stereotyping that applies to both men
and women‖ in ―that, historically, the marriage laws imposed sex-based
126
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roles for the partners to a marriage—male provider and female dependent—
that bore no relation to their inherent abilities to contribute to society.‖132
Worse, the intent and effect of the common law of marriage was to
subordinate a woman completely to her husband, wiping out her own
independent legal existence. Only with the passage in the nineteenth
century of laws such as Vermont‘s Rights of Married Women Act did state
legislatures begin ―to set a married woman free ‗from the thraldom of the
common law.‘‖133 As Justice Johnson notes,134 it took until 1973 for the
Supreme Court of Vermont to declare:
Having rejected the archaic principle that husband and wife are
―one person,‖ it must necessarily follow that a married woman is
a ―person‖ under the Constitution of Vermont, and is entitled to
135
all the rights guaranteed to a person.

Acknowledging that a history of denying the full personhood of
married women and a continued commitment to traditional fixed sex-roles
outside the bedroom, not only disgust at gay sex,136 can undergird
opposition to legal recognition of same-sex marriages, as Justice Johnson
demonstrates, does not weaken the constitutional case in favor of same-sex
marriage, it strengthens it, given the strength of our existing wellestablished constitutional prohibitions against embodying fixed sex-roles in
law.
Similarly, seeing that there are additional non-disgust based reasons
for some religious opposition to legal recognition of same-sex marriage also
strengthens, rather than weakens, the constitutional case for same-sex
marriage. As I have explained at length in other work, because of the
peculiar history of the intersection of religious and civil marriage in AngloAmerican law, Protestant denominations in the United States have
essentially abdicated the formation, definition, and, above all, the
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dissolution of marriage to the state.137 There is, for example, nothing like
the Jewish get or Catholic annulment available to or required of Protestants.
This leaves religiously conservative Protestants far more dependent on the
state‘s regulation of marriage, far less able to distinguish conceptually
between marriage as their religion defines it and as state law does, and, on a
percentage basis, far more opposed to same-sex marriage than conservative
Jews and Catholics, who otherwise, according to poll data, share their
opposition to homosexuality, but who, unlike Protestants, have reason to
understand full well that marriage in their faith tradition and marriage as the
state defines it are not the same.
For Protestants today, therefore, state-licensed marriage may
function in somewhat the same way as state-sponsored public schools did
for Protestants in the past. In each case a state-sponsored institution could
be put in service of sectarian ends by groups that substituted capture of the
state institution for development of their own clearly religious alternatives.
While Catholics and Jews, shut out of state education funding, founded
private sectarian schools, the curriculum in the ostensibly non-sectarian
public schools often tended to be infused with Protestant principles, and in a
host of Establishment Clause cases concerning the public schools,
Protestants resisted mightily any perceived attempt to make the institution
of public education more neutral and secular and less clearly an
embodiment of their values. Nowadays, similarly, evangelical Protestants‘
dependence on the state to articulate and enforce their view of marriage is
manifest, not only in their comparatively more virulent opposition to samesex marriage, but in the comparative zeal with which they seek to enshrine
covenant marriage in state law. Protestants, unlike Catholics and Jews, have
no established mechanism for denying divorce to members of their faith
community without the state backing them up.
With marriage, as with the public schools, Protestants took a statesponsored, state-funded, state-regulated institution, co-opted it for sectarian
ends, became accustomed to their ownership and control, and then felt an
understandable, though not justifiable, sense of loss and grievance when
that ownership was challenged. This observation helps make sense of the
frequently derided claim most often made by evangelical Protestants that
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their own marriages would be threatened by state recognition of same-sex
marriages. And a greater general awareness of the Establishment Clause
problems inherent in the way civil and religious marriage have become
imbricated once again strengthens, rather than weakens the constitutional
case for civil marriage for same-sex couples.
It is my profound hope, as it is Martha Nussbaum‘s, that in our
lifetime the U.S. Constitution will be held to guarantee equal marriage rites
and rights to couples regardless of their sex. But for this development and
for many other aspects of Nussbaum‘s proposed politics of humanity with
respect to sexual orientation as it pertains to constitutional law, I think the
better analogy is not the history of American law with respect to religious
freedom, but rather its history with respect to slavery. For intractable
practical reasons, even more than for ideological reasons, it proved, as
Abraham Lincoln predicted, impossible to maintain a nation half slave and
half free. Similarly, although we are in diametric disagreement about which
side of the ongoing gay rights debates should be analogized to proponents
of the legal recognition of slavery, one thing I agree with the most
vehement opponents of gay rights about is that, in the end, compromise or a
cuius regio eius religio solution on these issues in the U.S. is not possible,
and a permanent state of tolerance as opposed to endorsement by
government of one side or the other will be very difficult, if not impossible.
Like Lincoln,
I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the
house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will
become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents . . .
will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public
mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate
extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall
become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new—North
138
as well as South.

Demanding of the opponents of homosexuality that they tolerate—
indeed, not just tolerate but live in a state that embraces—a vision of gay
rights anything close to Nussbaum‘s is, I think we have to recognize, asking
a lot; it is asking of the opponents of gay rights something close to what
they are asking of gay rights activists today.
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Abraham Lincoln, House Divided Speech (June 16, 1858), available at
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/house.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2010).

